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DETERMINING STANDARDS FOR A
UNION'S DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION:
THE CASE FOR ORDINARY NEGLIGENCE
A labor union's duty of fair representation is a judicially
created doctrine' grounded in the union's statutory position as
exclusive representative of the members of its bargaining unit.2
The doctrine requires that the union represent all members of the
bargaining unit "without hostile discrimination, fairly, impartially,
and in good faith." 3  Courts have long applied this standard to
intentional union action that deprives an employee of fair rep-
resentation.4 Recently, several courts have extended the duty to
unintentional action, holding that gross or ordinary negligence by
union officials may constitute a breach of their duty. 5
Although the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) and
federal courts apply the statute' in construing the duty of fair
representation, the Board lagged years behind the courts in fully
defining the scope of an employee's right to fair representation. 7
The Board has traditionally declined to hold that negligent union
conduct constitutes a breach of the union's duty.8 Recent deci-
sions of the Board, however, indicate a possible change in that
position. 9
The Board should adopt an ordinary negligence standard.
This standard would most effectively protect the rights of indi-
vidual members and safeguard important union functions. In ad-
dition, the Board's adoption of an ordinary negligence standard
would free employers from some of the burdens of federal
breach-of-contract suits.
I
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The Supreme Court first articulated the union's duty to rep-
resent fairly all members of the bargaining unit in Steele v. Louis-
Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 198-203 (1944).
2 National Labor Relations Act § 101, 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1976); Railway Labor Act §
2, 45 U.S.C. § 152, Fourth (1976).
3 323 U.S. at 204.
4 Conduct that is hostile, in bad faith, or arbitrary is intentional. See notes 13-19 and
accompanying text infra.
5 See notes 20-36 and accompanying text infra.
National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-169 (1976).
See notes 10-12, 37 and accompanying text infra.
8 See notes 44-52 and accompanying text infra.
9 See notes 54-68 and accompanying text infra.
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ville & Nashville Railroad.II In that 1944 case, the Court held that
a union covered by the Railway Labor Act could not discriminate
against black members of the bargaining unit. On the same day
the Court announced its decision in Steele, it extended the duty of
fair union representation to other types of union discrimination
and to unions covered by the National Labor Relations Act." In
the following thirty-six years, the Court extended the obligation of
fair representation to all phases of union representation, includ-
ing contract enforcement and administration. 2
Federal courts defining the scope of a union's duty of fair
representation have focused on contract administration rather
than contract negotiation. This emphasis may stem from
employee acceptance of the need to compromise some individual
interests for the benefit of the majority in the negotiation process.
Because grievance processing involves an individual, rather than a
group, employees are more likely to contest the union's rejection
or compromise of a meritorious grievance.
In Vaca v. Sipes,13 the Supreme Court defined the basic ele-
ments of the duty of fair representation in grievance processing.
The Court rejected an employee's claim of an absolute right to
arbitration, the final step in the grievance procedure,'14 and held
that a union's decision not to champion a grievance breaches the
duty of fair representation only if it is "arbitrary, discriminatory,
or in bad faith." '" The Court added that a union also breaches
the duty by ignoring a grievance or by "perfunctory" process-
ing.16  Vaca did not clarify whether arbitrary conduct unaccom-
panied by bad faith breached the duty. This omission is significant
because a "bad faith" requirement proscribes only intentional
conduct, such as discrimination, dishonesty, fraud, or misrep-
resentation.
Most circuits '7 do not require plaintiffs alleging unfair griev-
30 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
11 Wallace Corp. v. NLRB, 323 U.S. 248 (1944).
12 See Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 342-43 (1964); Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S.
41, 46 (1957).
13 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
14 Id. at 191.
15 Id. at 190.
16 Id. at 194.
17 Ness v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 598 F.2d 558, 560 (9th Cir. 1979); Foust v. Interna-
tional Bhd. of Electrical Workers, 572 F.2d 710, 715 (10th Cir. 1978), revd in part on other
grounds, 99 S. Ct. 2121 (1979); Barton Brands, Ltd. v. NLRB, 529 F.2d 793, 799 (7th Cir.
1976); Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp., 523 F.2d 306 (6th Cir. 1975); Beriault v. Local 40,
Longshoremen's Union, 501 F.2d 258, 264 (9th Cir. 1974); Jones v. TWA, 495 F.2d 790,
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ance processing to show bad faith. 18  Rather, they find a breach
of duty of fair representation when the union's conduct is arbi-
trary. t9
798 (2d Cir. 1974); Sanderson v. Ford Motor Co., 483 F.2d 102, 110 (5th Cir. 1973);
Griffin v. UAW, 469 F.2d 181, 183 (4th Cir. 1972); Smith v. Pittsburgh Gage & Supply
Co., 464 F.2d 870, 875 (3d Cir. 1972); Retana v. Elevator Operators, Local 14, 453 F.2d
1018, 1023 n.8 (9th Cir. 1972).
For the First Circuit position, compare Brough v. United Steelworkers, 437 F.2d 748
(Ist Cir. 1971) (union not liable to injured worker for negligent inspection of machine
because federal labor law imposes duty of good faith, not duty of due care) with DeArroyo
v. Sindicato De Trabajadores Packinghouse, 425 F.2d 281, 284 (1st Cir. 1970), ("[Wlhile
due care has not been made a part of the union's duty," union held liable for failing to
investigate or process grievances even though union showed no bad faith, because reason
for failure was inexplicable and without rational basis) cert. denied sub nom., 400 U.S. 877
(1970). Although the Eighth Circuit has not explicitly rejected the bad faith requirement,
rejection can be implied from the cases discussed in text accompanying notes 55-63 infra.
18 The Supreme Court also appears to have rejected the bad faith requirement. In
Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 301 (1971), the Court seemed to
require bad faith by stating that "deliberate and severely hostile and irrational" conduct
established a breach, while "honest, mistaken" conduct, without bad motive or intent, did
not. Yet, in Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight Co., 424 U.S. 554 (1976), the Court may have
eliminated any requirement of bad faith. Hines held that an arbitration award could be set
aside if tainted by the union's failure to thoroughly investigate the employee's grievance,
even though the union's failure arose from an honest belief that the discharge was valid.
Id. at 556.
The Hines case involved three employees discharged for inflating motel expense
vouchers. The employer supported the discharge with affidavits from the motel clerk and
owner asserting the accuracy of the motel records. The union, faced with tthe employer's
affidavits, did not investigate the motel despite the employees' insistence. Arbitration up-
held the discharges. In their suit against the union and the employer, the employees pro-
duced a deposition from the motel clerk in which he admitted falsifying the records for his
own advantage. Id. at 556-59.
Hines' effect on the bad faith requirement is unclear, because the Supreme Court did
not rule on the merits of the fair representation question. While the Sixth Circuit found
sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case against the union for breach, 506 F.2d
1153, 1156 (6th Cir. 1974), the Supreme Court did not review that issue; it held only that
the district court erred in granting the employer's motion for summary judgment and that
the employer should be reinstated as a defendant. The Court held that he could not avoid
liability for breach by relying on an arbitration award tainted by the union's failure to
properly investigate the grievance. 424 U.S. at 569-72. See Rabin, The Duty of Fair Represen-
tation in Arbitration, in THE DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION 84, 86 (1. McKelvey ed. 1977)
[hereinafter cited as MCKELVEY]; Adomeit, Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight: Another Step in
the Seemingly Inexorable March Toward Converting Federal Judges (and Juries) Into Labor Arbi-
trators of Last Resort, 9 CONN. L. REV. 627, 636-37 (1977). Compare Lipsitz, The Implications of
Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, in McKELVEY, supra at 55, 58 & n.9 and Swedo, Ruzicka v.
General Motors Corp: Negligence, Exhaustion of Remedies, and Relief in Duty of Fair Representation
Cases, 33 ARB. J., June 1978, at 6, 8 and Note, The Union's Duty of Fair Representation-Fact
or Fiction, 60 MARQ. L. REV. 1116, 1125-26 (1977) with Fanning, The Duty of Fair Representa-
tion, 19 B.C. L. REV. 813, 819 (1978) and Rabin, supra at 89.
19 See, e.g., note 17 supra and cases cited therein. Arbitrary decisions lack a rational
basis; non-arbitrary decisions are based on relevant, permissible factors and the interests of
all employees:
636
1980] FAIR REPRESENTATION 637
Eliminating the "bad faith" requirement has allowed courts to
interpret the duty of fair representation as imposing an affirma-
tive duty on unions, rather than simply proscribing intentional
conduct, z" and has thus raised the possibility that negligence alone
might constitute "arbitrary" conduct that breaches the union's
duty of fair representation. The Second, Sixth, Eighth, and Ninth
Circuits and several district courts have adopted such a view, rul-
ing that negligent grievance processing constitutes a breach of the
union's duty. 2I The First, Third, Fourth, and Seventh Circuits
have held to the contrary. 22
Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp.23 was the first case to explicitly
hold that negligent grievance processing constituted a breach of
duty.24 The union, without evaluating the merits of a discharged
[W]e think a decision to be non-arbitrary must be (1) based upon relevant,
permissible union factors which excludes the possibility of it being based upon
motivations such as personal animosity or political favoritism; (2) a rational re-
sult of the consideration of those factors; and (3) inclusive of a fair and impar-
tial consideration of the interests of all employees.
Tedford v. Peabody Coal Co., 533 F.2d 952, 957 (5th Cir. 1976) (footnotes omitted). See
also Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 350 (1964).
20 A bad-faith standard of fair representation cannot enforce the union's affirma-
tive responsibilities. It can prohibit invidious distinctions like race and possibly
sex, and it can inhibit deliberate attempts to sacrifice the rights of individual
employees, but it cannot insure that a union will offer minimal representation
to all the employees it serves.
Clark, The Duty of Fair Representation: A Theoretical Structure, 51 TEXAS L. REv. 1119, 1132
(1973) (footnote omitted).
2 See Ethier v. United States Postal Serv., 590 F.2d 733 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 100 S.
Ct. 49 (1979); Price v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 586 F.2d 750 (9th Cir. 1978); Robesky v.
Qantas Empire Airways Ltd., 573 F.2d 1082 (9th Cir. 1978); Minnis v. UAW, 531 F.2d 850
(8th Cir. 1975); Ruzicka v. General Motor Corp., 523 F.2d 306 (6th Cir. 1975); Schum v.
South Buffalo Ry., 496 F.2d 328 (2d Cir. 1974); Holodnak v. Avco Corp., 381 F. Supp.
191 (D. Conn. 1974), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 514 F.2d 285 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
892 (1975); Thompson v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 258 F. Supp. 235 (E.D. Va.
1966).
22 See Buchanan v. NLRB, 597 F.2d 388, 394 (4th Cir. 1979); Dwyer v. Climatrol In-
dus. Inc., 544 F.2d 307, 311 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 932 (1977); Cannon v.
Consol. Freightways Corp., 524 F.2d 290, 294 (7th Cir. 1975); Brough v. United
Steelworkers, 437 F.2d 748, 750 (1st Cir. 1971); DeArroyo v. Sindicato De Trabajadores
Packinghouse, 425 F.2d 281, 284 (1st Cir.), cert. denied sub nom., 400 U.S. 877 (1970);
Bazarte v. United Transp. Union, 429 F.2d 868, 872 (3d Cir. 1970).
23 523 F.2d 306 (6th Cir. 1975).
24 Prior to Ruzicka, the type of conduct held to be arbitrary supported a negligence
standard by implication. In Thompson v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 258 F. Supp.
235, 239 (E.D. Va. 1966), the court held that the union breached its duty to properly
represent the employee when its representation was careless and perfunctory. The court
found that the combination of the union's inadequate preparation, its inadequate presenta-
tion at the hearing and its failure to notify the employee of the date of the arbitration
constituted a breach of the duty. Id. In Holodnak v. Avco Corp., 381 F. Supp. 191, 199-
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employee's grievance, failed to file a crucial paper in the griev-
ance procedure. 2  The Sixth Circuit held that "[s]uch negligent
handling of the grievance, unrelated as it was to the merits of [the
employee's] case, amounts to unfair representation. It is a clear
example of arbitrary and perfunctory handling of a griev-
ance." 26 By emphasizing the union's failure to evaluate the
merits of the employee's claim,27 the court hinted that negligence
served merely as evidence of arbitrary conduct-not as a separate
standard sufficient to establish the union's breach.2 8  Such an in-
terpretation would preclude plaintiffs from establishing a breach
simply by proving unintentionally careless conduct. The court also
failed to explain whether ordinary rather than gross negligence
would breach the duty. In a concurring opinion, Judge McCree
declared that the union's inexplicable failure to act constituted
"behavior so egregious" that it breached the duty of fair represen-
tation.2 9 The use of the word "egregious" suggests that only
200 (D. Conn. 1974), affd in part, rev'd in part, 514 F.2d 285 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
892 (1975), the trial court found the union liable for perfunctory and passive representa-
tion of an employee at an arbitration hearing on his discharge. The company discharged
the employee for publishing an article critical of his employer in a political newspaper. 381
F. Supp. at 199-200. The union representative failed to make effective arguments based on
the employee's right to free speech and instead argued that the employee deserved le-
niency because he was ignorant and stupid. Id. at 196, 199-200. On appeal, the Second
Circuit did not review the fair representation decision. 514 F.2d at 287. In Schum v. South
Buffalo Ry., 496 F.2d 328, 331-32 (2d Cir. 1974), the court implicitly recognized the pos-
sibility that, in the accompanying action against the union, a breach of the union's duty
might be found in the union's unintentional failure to pursue fully the employee's griev-
ance and to notify the employee of its inaction.
25 Ruzicka, fired for intoxication on the job, filed a timely grievance with his union.
The company answered his complaint, and a local union official initiated the third stage of
the procedure by filing a "notice of unadjusted grievance." The official nonetheless left
uncompleted this third stage by failing to file a "statement of unadjusted grievance," even
though the union had sought and received two deadline extensions. 523 F.2d at 308-10.
Before filing suit in federal court, Ruzicka pursued union remedies against the local
official who failed to file the statement. A trial before the local union committee found the
official guilty of negligence but not of willful inaction. The NLRB dismissed Ruzicka's
complaint against the official. Id.
26 Id. at 310.
2' The union asked the Sixth Circuit to affirm the. trial court, which had found no
breach because Ruzicka failed to show union bad faith or hostility. The Sixth Circuit held
that the employee need not show bad faith. Id. at 309-10. See also Ruzicka v. General
Motors Corp., 528 F.2d 912, 913 (6th Cir. 1975).
26 523 F.2d at 309-10.
21 Judge McCree stated that "a total failure to act, whether negligent or intentional,
except for a proper reason, is behavior so egregious that, as in the case of bad faith, hostile
discrimination, arbitrariness or perfunctoriness, the union should be held responsible." 523
F.2d at 316.
19801 FAIR REPRESENTATION 639
gross negligence would breach the duty. 30  Such a standard com-
ports with the majority's emphasis on the lack of any reason for
the union's conduct. 31  Action taken for no reason represents
conduct so unreasonable as to constitute gross, rather than ordi-
nary, negligence.
Courts adopting the Ruzicka standard have not explained
whether a gross or ordinary negligence standard should apply.3 2
The Eighth Circuit found union conduct negligent only if it was
neither grounded in reason nor based on the union's good faith
evaluation of the merits of the employee's claim.33 The Ninth
Circuit found a breach of the duty of fair representation when
the union's conduct showed reckless disregard for an employee's
rights. 34 After Ruzicka, however, the Sixth Circuit suggested that
30 Rabin, The Impact of the Duty of Fair Representation Upon Labor Arbitration, 29 SYRACUSE
L. REV. 851, 857 (1978).
Ordinary negligence is failure to exercise the care that a reasonable, ordinary man
would exercise in similar circumstances. There are differing concepts of gross negligence.
Some view gross negligence as the intermediate point on a scale between ordinary negli-
gence and willful, wanton or reckless conduct. Others define gross negligence as qualita-
tively different from ordinary negligence. This definition includes conduct with conscious
indifference to the consequences so great as to suggest willingness to achieve the conse-
quences. See generally, W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 149-50, 183-86 (4th ed. 1971). Judge
McCree's concept of negligence embraces both types.
n" "The Union made no decision as to the merits of Appellant's grievance, but merely
allowed it to expire out of negligent and perfunctory handling." 523 F.2d at 310 (emphasis
added). In its decision on a petition for rehearing, the court limited Ruzicka to cases in
which "unexplained union inaction ... has barred an employee from access to an established
union-management apparatus for resolving grievances." Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp.,
528 F.2d 912, 913 (6th Cir. 1975) (emphasis added). Relying on this language, several
commentators interpret Ruzicka to proscribe procedural negligence rather than substantive
negligence in a union's decision on the merits of a grievance. See Swedo, supra note 18, at
10; 44 FORDHAM L. REV. 1062, 1067 (1976). See generally Rabin, supra note 30, at 857.
'2 Ethier v. United States Postal Serv., 590 F.2d 733 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 49
(1979); Robesky v. Qantas Empire Airways Ltd., 573 F.2d 1082 (9th Cir. 1978); Minnis v.
UAW, 531 F.2d 850 (8th Cir. 1975). Cf. Franklin v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 593 F.2d
899 (9th Cir. 1979) (failure of union to present medical record to arbitration board was at
most negligent and thus not breach).
33 In Minnis v. UAW, 531 F.2d 850 (8th Cir. 1975), the court overturned a summary
judgment dismissal of Minnis' claim of union breach. The employee alleged that the union
accepted his grievance yet inexplicably failed to represent him and delayed six months in
notifying him it had dropped his grievance. In Ethier v. United States Postal Serv., 590
F.2d 733 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 49 (1979), the court applied the inexplicable
action standard. Because unclear contract language explained the union steward's failure to
file Ethier's grievance within the time limits, the court held the union had not breached its
duty of fair representation. Id. at 736-37. The court also noted the union's substantial
efforts to resolve the grievance through informal discussions with the employer. Id. at 736.
34 In Robesky v. Qantas Empire Airways Ltd., 573 F.2d 1082 (9th Cir. 1978), the union
sought arbitration of the employee's discharge grievance after the arbitration deadline had
passed. The union eventually relinquished the employee's right to arbitrate in exchange for
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negligence alone will establish a breach, thus broadening the un-
ion's duty to include ordinary as well as gross negligence. 5 In a
recent case, the Eighth Circuit also apparently adopted an ordi-
nary negligence standard. 36
II
THE NLRB's ROLE
In defining the scope of the union's duty of fair representa-
tion, the NLRB has slowly followed the direction set by the fed-
eral courts.3 7  Eighteen years after the Supreme Court enunciated
a settlement that amounted to a reinstatement. The union, however, failed to notify the
employee of either its decision to settle or its initial late filing. As a result, the employee
rejected the company's settlement offer, thinking she still had a chance for a better remedy
through arbitration. Id. at 1083-87. The Ninth Circuit held that the union's failure to in-
form, though unintentional, was arbitrary conduct breaching its duty of fair representa-
tion.
While courts have said negligent conduct is not enough to breach the duty of
fair representation, these references are to simple negligence violating the tort
standard of due care. Acts of omission by union officials not intended to harm
members may be so egregious, so far short of minimum standards of fairness to
the employee and so unrelated to legitimate union interests as to be arbitrary.
Id. at 1089-90 (footnote omitted).
The Ninth Circuit established a three-prong test in Robesky to determine when an un-
intentional act of a union breached its duty: (1) the act must recklessly disregard the
employee's rights, (2) prejudice the employee by denying potential remedies, and (3) be
unjustified by the policies underlying the duty of fair representation.
Cf Price v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 586 F.2d 750, 754 (9th Cir. 1978) (court found
no breach because union's failure to file formal grievance or present exculpatory evidence
at informal hearing did not constitute "irrational, intentional, or egregiously unfair unin-
tentional conduct.").
'5 See Milstead v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 957, 580 F.2d 232, 235-36
(6th Cir. 1978) (court expanded Ruzicka standard from union nonperformance to substan-
dard union performance); Malone v. United States Postal Serv., 526 F.2d 1099, 1110 (6th
Cir. 1975) (court interpreted Ruzicka to mean that if "union negligently fails to take any
action at all to process an employee's grievance, it has breached the duty of fair representa-
tion").
36 Smith v. Hussman Refrig. Co., No. 78-1034 (8th Cir., filed Jan. 21, 1980 (en banc)).
In Hussman, the court held that the union's decision to champion the grievances of certain
employees constituted arbitrary and perfunctory action. The company promoted three
employees on the basis of skill and ability, rather than seniority, under a contract clause
that provided that seniority controlled only when the skill of two candidates was equal. Id.
at 4-5. The union, which had negotiated this promotion clause, processed the grievances of
four disappointed employees who had greater seniority without measuring their skills
against those of the three successful candidates. Id. at 20. The union offered seniority as
the reason for its action, but the court rejected that reason as insufficient in light of the
union's statutory duty to fairly represent all employees. Id. at 18-22.
'7 In establishing the NLRB, Congress delegated part of its control over interstate
commerce to the Board. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141, 153 (1976). The Board thus has derivative
power to interpret and apply the National Labor Relations Act through decisions and regu-
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the duty in Steele,3" the Board found in Miranda Fuel Co.39 that a
breach of this duty constituted an unfair labor practice. 40  The
Board found a breach when "irrelevant, invidious or unfair" con-
siderations determined the handling of an employee's grievance 4'
lations. Federal courts can review NLRB unfair labor practice decisions when the Board
seeks enforcement or when an aggrieved party appeals a Board decision. Thus, the Board
is bound by federal court decisions in a limited number of cases; it need not follow federal
decisions that do not review Board actions. See M. FORKOSCH, A TREATISE ON LABOR LAW
§§ 295-296 (1953); F. MCCULLOUGH & T. BORNSTEIN, THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
BOARD 116 (1974); K. McGuINNEss, HOW TO TAKE A CASE BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS BOARD §§ 17-23, 17-24 (4th ed. 1976).
Nonetheless, doctrinal consistency is desirable because state and federal courts share
jurisdiction with the NLRB over cases involving the fair representation duty. Cf. Vaca v.
Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 180-88 (1967) (state courts have jurisdiction over § 301 suits alleging
breach of fair representation duty although NLRB deems such union conduct within
Board's jurisdiction); Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195, 196-98 (1962) (state
courts have jurisdiction over § 301 suits alleging breach of conduct although conduct may
also be unfair labor practice).
3 Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
39 140 N.L.R.B. 181, 51 L.R.R.M. 1584, enforcement denied, 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963).
40 Id. The Board majority stated that § 9 of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)
(29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1976)) establishes a union as the exclusive bargaining agent once
selected by a majority of the union members. This status confers a correlative duty to
represent all bargaining unit members fairly and impartially. The duty of fair representa-
tion constitutes an aspect of the employee's right, under § 7 of the NLRA (29 U.S.C. § 157
(1976)), to bargain collectively. Thus a union that breaches its implied § 9 duty also inter-
feres with the employee's ,right to bargain collectively. In turn, such interference is an
unfair labor practice under § 8(b)(1)(A) of the NLRA. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A) (1976). 140
N.L.R.B. at 184-86, 51 L.R.R.M. at 1586-87.
The Second Circuit rejected the Board's finding of an unfair labor practice in NLRB
v. Miranda Fuel Co., 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963). The court stated that the union's breach
of the duty of fair representation constitutes an unfair labor practice only when union
actions are motivated by union considerations, such as a desire to promote union member-
ship or to punish workers opposing the union leadership. Id. at 175-80. Subsequently,
three circuits have upheld the Board's view of when violations of the fair representation
duty constitute an unfair labor practice. See NLRB v. Local 106, Glass Bottle Blowers, 520
F.2d 693 (6th Cir. 1975); Truck Drivers Local 568 v. NLRB, 379 F.2d 137 (D.C. Cir.
1967); Local 12, United Rubber Workers v. NLRB, 368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 837 (1967).
The Board remains divided on the scope of the fair-representation unfair labor prac-
tice. Chairman Fanning has expressed doubts as to whether the union's § 9 obligation to
represent impartially is included in an employee's § 7 rights and would find an unfair
labor practice only when the union's breach of duty "restrains or coerces" an employee in
the exercise of these rights (i.e., violated § 8(b)(1)(A)). He would not extend unfair labor
practice status to other violations of § 8(b), which forbids union action to coerce employers
to discriminate against employees (§ 8(b)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(2) (1976)) and prohibits
union refusals to bargain (§ 8(b)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(3) (1976)). Fanning, supra note 18,
at 832.
For a view of the impact of the Miranda Fuel dissent on Board decisions see Bryson, A
Matter of Wooden Logic: Labor Law Preemption and Individual Rights, 51 TExAs L. Rv. 1037,
1074-84 (1973).
41 140 N.L.R.B. at 185, 51 L.R.R.M. at 1587.
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and characterized such actions as arbitrary. 42  Miranda Fuel's em-
phasis on rationality in decisionmaking 43 could have provided a
convenient springboard for the Board's adoption of the view that
arbitrary conduct constituted a breach of duty. Instead, the Board
insisted that plaintiffs, to establish a breach, prove that the union
acted in bad faith."
In 1975, the Board appeared to eliminate the bad faith re-
quirement. In Truck Drivers Local 315 (Rhodes & Jamieson, Ltd.),45
the Board declared that the union's duty was, in part, of a
fiduciary nature that entailed affirmative responsibilities as well as
the obligation to refrain from activity tainted by bad faith or hos-
tility.46 The affirmative aspect of the duty proscribed arbitrary
and unfair union action.47 Rhodes & Jamieson appeared to aban-
42 Id. at 185-86, 51 L.R.R.M. at 1587.
43 See note, The NLRB and the Duty of Fair Representation: The Case of the Reluctant Guard-
ian, 29 U. FLA. L. REV. 437, 443 (1977).
44 In General Truck Drivers Local 692, 209 N.L.R.B. 446, 447-48, 85 L.R.R.M. 1385,
1386-87 (1974), the Board said:
[W]e do not equate mere negligence with the irrelevant, invidious, or unfair
considerations which the Board, in Miranda ... also characterized as "arbitrary
conduct."
... [S]omething more than mere negligence is required ....
... [I]t is clear that negligent action or nonaction of a union by itself will
not be considered to be arbitrary, irrelevant, invidious, or unfair so as to consti-
tute a breach of the duty of fair representation violative of the [Labor Man-
agement Relations] Act.
The "something more" was bad faith or hostility. See Local 933, UAW, 193 N.L.R.B. 223,
78 L.R.R.M. 1663 (1971); Local 485, International Union of Elec. Workers, 170 N.L.R.B.
1234, 67 L.R.R.M. 1609 (1968); Local 18, International Union of Operating Eng'rs, 144
N.L.R.B. 1365, 54 L.R.R.M. 1235 (1963).
45 217 N.L.R.B. 616, 89 L.R.R.M. 1049 (1975), enforced, 545 F.2d 1173 (9th Cir. 1976).
Rhodes & Jamieson involved a union contract with several employers that gave
employees a right to reassignment on the basis of seniority when a company eliminated
jobs. The union reserved the option not to apply the provision in a particular case. After a
company announced that several delivery drivers would lose their regular assignments, the
union polled its membership on the reassignment issue. The wording of the referendum
inaccurately implied that many workers would be reassigned, and the members voted
against reassignment. 217 N.L.R.B. at 616-19, 89 L.R.R.M. at 1050-52.
46 Id. at 617, 89 L.R.R.M. at 1051.
47 The Board noted that it had adopted in Miranda Fuel the view that the duty of fair
representation is "in a sense fiduciary in nature." Id. at 617, 89 L.R.R.M. at 1051, quoting
Miranda Fuel, 140 N.L.R.B. at 189, 51 L.R.R.M. at 1589. The Board continued:
[Ilts fiduciary nature connotes some degree of affirmative responsibility ...
[Tihe duty of fair representation is more than an absence of bad faith or hos-
tile motivation. ....
Another way this elusive element of the duty of fair representation has
been authoritatively described is the avoidance or arbitrary conduct. Here
again, although phrased in negative terms, the duty is to some extent an
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don the bad faith requirement and to allow plaintiffs to establish a
breach of the duty of fair representation by showing arbitrary ac-
tion or unfair decisionmaking. 48
Since Rhodes & Jamieson, the Board has wavered in its ap-
proach. In a number of cases the Board based its finding of a
breach of duty on the presence of bad faith.49 The Board some-
times strained to identify a scintilla of hostility in order to rectify
what appeared to be negligent conduct.50 The facts in other
affirmative one, for a common characteristic or [sic] arbitrariness is the absence
of some ingredient in the decisionmaking process. ....
The prohibition of decisionmaking supported by no reason, as well as de-
cisionmaking for impermissible reasons, is a modest enough beginning for us.
... And if a duty to avoid arbitrary conduct, as part of an affirmative, fiduciary
responsibility, means anything, it must mean at least that there be a reason for
action taken. Sometimes the reason will be apparent, sometimes not. When it is
not the circumstances may be such that we will have no choice but to deem the
conduct arbitrary if the union does not tell us what it is.
Rhodes &Jamieson, 217 N.L.R.B. at 617-18, 89 L.R.R.M. at 1051.
The Board found that because the union scheduled the vote after the layoff and lim-
ited voting to those who would be affected by the "bumping" at issue,
the election itself was designed so that it could express, not fairness, but only
the conflict of interest of each member of the electorate.
The duty of fair representation being an affirmative duty, the obligations it
encompasses cannot be avoided by delegating the authority to make decisions.
Here the Union in effect delegated this authority .... It could not ... abdicate
the responsibility for fair treatment of the employees affected by the decision.
By selecting the method for determining its action the Union underwrote the
fairness of the method. ... [T]he method was not fair. We hold that it did not
meet the minimum statutory standard of fairness.
Id. at 619, 89 L.R.R.M. at 1052-53.
48 The Ninth Circuit upheld the Board decision, saying that the timing and narrow
scope of the referendum made the decision arbitrary and without rational basis. The court
thus incorporated fairness into the standard of non-arbitrary conduct. NLRB v. Truck
Drivers Local 315, 545 F.2d 1173, 1175-76 (9th Cir. 1976).
" See, e.g., Local 417, UAW (Falcon Indus. Inc.), 245 N.L.R.B. No. 75, 102 L.R.R.M.
1466 (1979) (breach of fair representation duty found from failure to properly process
grievance either without any reason or because the union had had dispute with the
employee or resented the allegation of racial discrimination in connection with the griev-
ance. Chairman Fanning relied on evidence of union official's animosity toward employee
in finding breach); Pacific Coast Utilities Serv. Inc., 238 N.L.R.B. No. 82, 99 L.R.R.M.
1619 (1978) (union breached duty by failure to fully process grievance because discharged
employee supported rival union). Clerks & Checkers Local 1593, 234 N.L.R.B. 511, 94
L.R.R.M. 1328 (1978) (union refused to process grievance because member failed to with-
draw it earlier, despite threat of reprisals); ITT Arctic Servs., Inc., 238 N.L.R.B. No. 14,
99 L.R.R.M. 1659 (1978) (union's failure to investigate grievance and to give employee
opportunity to be heard constituted breach; steward hostile because employee had
criticized steward's performance).
50 In Local 3784, United Steelworkers, 223 N.L.R.B. 1184, 92 L.R.R.M. 1108 (1976),
employer discharged grievant as a result of a misunderstanding regarding the date griev-
ant would be able to return to work. When the grievant requested that the union file a
grievance, and told the union president she had obtained a medical excuse for her absence,
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cases indicated the presence of hostility, although the Board did
not cite them as grounds for its decision."' Recent cases indicate
that the Board has finally discarded the bad faith requirement. In
several decisions, the Board has found breaches of the duty of
fair representation despite explicit findings that hostility was ab-
sent.52  The Board has also found breach by applying the arbi-
trary conduct standard alone, without explicitly finding that bad
faith was absent and without any hint of bad faith in the facts.53
he said that he didn't "give a damn" and refused to process the grievance. Id. at 1184, 92
L.R.R.M. at 1108. He falsely contended that the seven-day period for filing a grievance
had passed, and even after the employer showed the union president a letter from the
doctor explaining the delay in the employee's recovery, the union officer filed no griev-
ance. Id. at 1186-89, 92 L.R.R.M. 1108-09.
The Board affirmed an administrative law judge's finding that there had been "a total
failure and refusal on the part of the [union] to file and process a grievance for Beshears
... that the refusal was based on hostility to Beshears." Id. at 1188. Evidence of hostility
consisted of the union president's statements that he "didn't give a damn" and that the
grievance period had expired. The union president also demonstrated hostility on the wit-
ness stand when he described the employee's repeated complaints about work assignments
as 'just bitching." Id. at 1189 n.18.
In Glass Bottle Blowers Ass'n Local 106, 240 N.L.R.B. No. 29, 100 L.R.R.M. 1294
(1979), the union refused to process two seniority grievances and failed to tell the grievants
that the union officers believed the grievants had waived their seniority rights. Although
the Board found this conduct perfunctory and therefore a breach, it noted that "there is
considerable background evidence of hostility ... toward the skilled trades ...." 100
L.R.R.M. at 1295. The Board also found evidence of hostility in the remarks of the union
officials as well as their resistance to filing and their failure to state the grievants' case fully
upon presentation to the Local's executive board. 100 L.R.R.M. at 1295-96. Such conduct,
however, could be simply evidence of arbitrary, perfunctory processing.
"t See, e.g. Brown Transp. Corp., 239 N.L.R.B. No. 91, 100 L.R.R.M. 1016 (1978)
(where employee was discharged after he complained of racial discrimination and men-
tioned Teamsters Union as replacement for employees' association, association breached
duty by failing to investigate his complaint, to argue on his behalf at hearing, and to de-
fend him from racial slurs or allow him to complete his testimony); Penn Indus., Inc., 233
N.L.R.B. 928, 97 L.R.R.M. 1299 (1977) (union breached duty by refusing, for irrelevant
reason, to process grievance of union activist opposed by union leaders but supported by
members). The Board's continuing emphasis on the bad faith requirement may stem from
a division on the board. See notes 69-71 and accompanying text infra.
" See, e.g., Newport News Shipbldg. & Dry Dock Co., 236 N.L.R.B. 1470, 98 L.R.R.M.
1465 (1978) (majority found no hostility in union's perfunctory processing, although ad-
ministrative law judge maintained action was motivated by grievant's non-union status);
Service Employees Int'l, Local 579, 229 N.L.R.B. 692, 95 L.R.R.M. 1156 (1977) finding
breach of duty because failure to process grievance was arbitrary and unreasonable, al-
though evidence insufficient to show that refusal was based on grievant's failure to attend
union meetings); P & L Cedar Prods., 224 N.L.R.B. 244, 261, 93 L.R.R.M. 1341, (1976)
(record insufficient to show that union's failure to investigate and process grievances moti-
vated by animosity between grievants and shop steward). Cf. Forsyth Hardwood Co., 243
N.L.R.B. No. 150, 102 L.R.R.M. 1019 (1979) (refusal to process employee's grievance not
breach because refusal neither arbitrary nor hostile).
" See Steelworkers Local 7748 (Eaton Corp.), 246 N.L.R.B. No. 6, 102 L.R.R.M. 1411
(1979); United States Postal Serv., 240 N.L.R.B. No. 178, 100 L.R.R.M. 1371 (1979).
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In P & L Cedar Products,5 4 the Board first moved beyond the
arbitrary conduct standard to find that grossly negligent union
treatment of employee grievances breached the duty of fair rep-
resentation. A factory owner discharged two shinglemakers, Stal-
cup and Holmgren, after they complained about safety conditions
and the quality of work materials. Union representatives discussed
the grievance with their employer without interviewing Stalcup
and Holmgren.5 5 The union officials apparently acquiesced in
Stalcup's discharge, but won reinstatement for Holmgren. 56  The
following day, the employer reneged on the reinstatement. The
union officials repeatedly refused to file grievances for either
employee.57  The NLRB affirmed the administrative law judge's
finding that the union had breached its duty to both
employees. 58 The judge applied the arbitrary conduct test to the
union's failure to insist that the employer honor her promise to
reinstate Holmgren, and found that the union acted "without any
rational explanation."59  In Stalcup's case, the judge went further
than the arbitrary conduct test, holding that the union's duty of
fair representation included "'the duty to act as advocate for the
grievant. Failure to discuss the case with [Stalcup] was not mere
negligence, it was a reckless disregard of his [sic] rights.' "60 The
judge applied a gross negligence standard, similar to that enun-
ciated by Judge McCree in Ruzicka.
As conceived by the Board, the duty to advocate currently
includes the responsibility to investigate the grievance and to pre-
sent the grievant's case fully and fairly."' The Board applies a
54 224 N.L.R.B. 244, 93 L.R.R.M. 134 (1976).
55 Id. at 249, 255-56.
56 Id. at 256.
57 Id. at 255-57, 260.
58 Id. at 244, 260.
59 Id. at 260.
'0 Id. (quoting E.L. Mustie & Sons, Inc., 215 N.L.R.B. 203, 208, 88 L.R.R.M. 1328
(1975), quoting Truck Drivers Local 705 (Associated Transp., Inc.), 209 N.L.R.B. 630, 86
L.R.R.M. 1119 (1974)). The judge found that the union action in handling Stalcup's griev-
ance was "half-hearted and fell far short of the standards which govern a union's rep-
resentation of its members." 224 N.L.R.B. at 260. The union representative failed to inter-
view Stalcup before meeting with the employer, and in the meeting, accepted without
investigation the employer's uncorroborated assertions of Stalcup's insubordination "despite
the fact that the surrounding circumstances cried out for an investigation." Id.
1 Service Employees Local 579 (Convacare of Decatur), 229 N.L.R.B. 692, 695, 95
L.R.R.M. 1156 (1977); P & L Cedar Prods., 224 N.L.R.B. 244, 93 L.R.R.M. 1341 (1975);
Teamsters Local 542 (Golden Hill Convalescent Hosp.), 223 N.L.R.B. 533, 536, 91
L.R.R.M. 1556 (1976); Truck Drivers Local 705 (Associated Transp., Inc.), 209 N.L.R.B.
292, 292, 86 L.R.R.M. 1119, 1121 (1974), petition for review denied, 532 F.2d 1169 (7th Cir.
1976).
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gross negligence standard in assessing the adequacy of the union's
presentation of a grievant's case. The Board has held that an out-
right statement contrary to the employee's interest constituted a
breach, 62 while a careless lapse that revealed damaging evidence
to the employer did not.6 3  The Board has waffled on the stan-
dard of conduct necessary to establish a breach of the union's re-
sponsibility to investigate a grievance adequately. After holding in
P & L Cedar Products that failure to investigate and acquiescence
to the employer's position on discharge was gross negligence, 64 in
Service Employees Local 579 65 the Board characterized similar con-
duct as "arbitrary.""6 The Board maintained that it would not
impose on unions the ordinary negligence standard of care
applicable, for example, to attorney-client relationships. 67  Sub-
62 Truck Drivers Local 705 (Associated Transp., Inc.), 209 N.L.R.B. 292, 86 L.R.R.M.
1119 (1974) (duty to advocate breached when union representative told grievance board
that grievance lacked merit) petition for review denied, 532 F.2d 1169 (7th Cir. 1976).
63 Teamsters Local 542 (Golden Hill Convalescent Hosp.), 223 N.L.R.B. 533, 537, 91
L.R.R.M. 1556 (1976). (Union attorney's failure to impeach employer's witness held not to
breach union's duty to fully and fairly represent the grievants). See also UAW Local 122,
239 N.L.R.B. No. 151, 100 L.R.R.M. 1124 (1978).
64 224 N.L.R.B. at 260.
65 229 N.L.R.B. 692, 95 L.R.R.M. 1157 (1977).
66 Id. at 692, 95 L.R.R.M. at 1157. The employer discharged the grievant for switching
shifts with another employee, although the employee had oral permission from her super-
visor as required by contract. The employer justified the discharge to the union steward on
the basis of the grievant's prior disciplinary record. The administrative law judge con-
cluded that the union officials
abdicated their responsibilities toward [the grievant] by failing to question, or
even consider, the validity of the reason assigned for [the grievant's] discharge.
[The grievant] was discharged for allegedly switching shifts without permission,
not for her past derelictions. ... [The steward] did not seek [the grievant's] side
of the story .... This failure to inquire into the validity of the stated reason for
the discharge, and willingness to evaluate the worth of an employee solely
through the eyes of the employer, is more than mere negligence or ineptitude.
It is perfunctory grievance handling and so unreasonable as to be arbitrary.
Id. at 695-96.
A similar failure to fully investigate the grievant's case was held to be arbitrary conduct
breaching the duty in Newport News Shipbldg. & Dry Dock Co., 236 N.L.R.B. 1470, 98
L.R.R.M. 1465, 1466 (1978). Twenty employees working on an exposed platform in sub-
freezing weather stopped work for 20 minutes until their spokesman ascertained that they
would not be sent home because of bad weather. The company discharged the spokesman
the next day. The union agent talked briefly with two of the employees involved, but not
with the spokesman, before acquiescing in the discharge. The union refused to appeal the
discharge or reply to the grievant's appeal request. The administrative law judge in Newport
News found the union's representation "arbitrary and perfunctory," but used none of the
gross negligence language of P & L Cedar Prods., 224 N.L.R.B. 244, 260 (1978), 93
L.R.R.M. 1341 (1976).
617 But we do not adopt any implication that, in the informal, investigative, or
bargaining stage of a grievance, a collective-bargaining representative's duty to
an employee it represents is analagous to that owed by an attorney to a client.
646
1980] FAIR REPRESENTATION 647
sequently, the Board arguably appeared to return to a negligence
standard of due care. 68
The fluctuation in the Board's position reflects the differing
views of its members. Member Truesdale would retain the bad
faith requirement, 69 yet would find that extreme neglect, such as
gross negligence, would breach the duty of fair representation. 70
The nature of the relation between a labor organization and an individual
employee is more nearly that of a legislator to a constituent. Cf. Steele v. Louis-
ville & Nashville Railroad Co., et al., 323 U.S. 192 (1944). Although that requires
that union decisions affecting employees be made in good faith, application of
the strict standard of allegiance owed by an attorney to a client might well
preclude representation by a union of more than one member because of the
potential conflicts of interest.
229 N.L.R.B. at 692 n.2, 95 L.R.R.M. at 1157.
'8 In Boilermakers Local 667 (Union Boiler Co.), 242 N.L.R.B. No. 167, 101 L.R.R.M.
1430 (1979), the union hiring hall followed an unwritten policy of delaying the referral to
field jobs of persons who quit shop'jobs. Two grievants, denied field jobs under this policy,
filed a grievance. The Board concluded that the union's unwritten policy was not arbitrary
conduct, breaching the duty of fair representation, because the policy had a reasonable
basis-to prevent closing of shops and the concomitant loss of jobs. However, the Board
held that the union breached its duty by failing to articulate the rule in definite terms and
publicize it to the membership. The Board thus applied a more stringent standard than
arbitrariness and imposed a standard that could be characterized as ordinary, rather than
gross, negligence. In Newspaper Guild Local 35, 239 N.L.R.B. No. 175, 100 L.R.R.M. 1179
(1979), an employee challenged the promotion of a less senior employee. The union proc-
essed her grievance without investigating the qualifications of the less senior employee.
The Board found that the contract was unclear on whether seniority or superior qualifica-
tions governed promotions when both employees were equally qualified. The Board said,
however, that in a case where the language of the agreement clearly made seniority dis-
positive only when qualifications were equal, the union "would, of course, have been
obliged to consider the relative qualifications of the two applicants." Id., 100 L.R.R.M. at
1181. The Board thus endorsed the same policy the Eighth Circuit applied in Smith v.
Hussmann Refrig. Co. (No. 78-1034 (8th Cir., filed Jan. 21, 1980) (en banc)) which re-
quired that the union's decision be based on careful investigation. This policy goes beyond
the arbitrary standard, requiring care that satisfies the "reasonable man" standard.
69 Truesdale argued that eliminating the bad faith requirement, thus allowing arbitrary
and negligent conduct to breach the duty, would encourage courts and the Board to in-
trude into intraunion judgments. Speech before Federal Bar Association, 1979, Southwest
Regional Conference, Dallas, Tex., (Mar. 1, 1979), reprinted in [1979] 4 LAB. L. REP (CCH)
9186, at 15,757 [hereinafter cited as Truesdale Speech]; Newport News Shipbldg. & Dry
Dock Co., 236 N.L.R.B. 1470, 1471 n. 9, 98 L.R.R.M. 1465, 1467 n. 9 (1978); see United
States Postal Serv., 240 N.L.R.B. No. 178, 100 L.R.R.M. 1371, 1373 (1979) (dissenting
opinion, Truesdale).
70 4 LAB. L. REP. at 15,758. Truesdale prefers the standard set in Barhitte v. Kroger
Co., 99 L.R.R.M. 2663 (W.D. Mich. 1978), in which the court held that "extreme neglect or
intentional disregard of a grievant's case ... must occur before [the union's action] be-
comes 'arbitrary' action .... All that plaintiff alleges is that the union acted negligently.
Unless this negligence shocks the conscience of the court so as to rise to the level of gross
negligence," plaintiff has not established a prima facie case of breach. Id. at 2669-70. Judge
McCree, concurring in Ruzicka, 523 F.2d 306 (6th Cir. 1975), contended that gross negli-
gence was equivalent to bad faith or hostile discrimination. Id. at 316. Thus, Truesdale can
reconcile his inclusion of gross negligence with his insistence on the presence of bad faith.
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Chairman Fanning has shown similar reluctance to abandon the
bad faith requirement- and holds a more limited view of the appli-
cation of the duty of fair representation than do other mem-
bers.71  The Board's General Counsel recently issued guidelines 72
stating that bad faith, arbitrary conduct, and, possibly, gross neg-
ligence equivalent to reckless disregard should establish a breach,
but that "inept, negligent, unwise and insensitive, or ineffectual"
conduct alone should not.73  The counsel's position does not bind
the Board, however.7 4  Only definitive action by the Board itself
will clarify the role of negligence in the duty of fair representa-
tion.
7' See, e.g., Local 417, UAW (Falcon Indus.), 245 N.L.R.B. No. 75, 102 L.R.R.M. 1466
(1979), in which Fanning voted to find breach solely because the administrative law judge
found that the union's failure to process a grievance stemmed from the union president's
animosity toward the grievant. Fanning did not reach the issue of "whether, absent animos-
ity ... [the union's] inaction amounted to a willful failure to process her grievance." Id.
72 NLRB General Counsel, Memorandum on Duty of Fair Representation, July 9,
1979, reprinted in 48 U.S.L.W. 2081 (July 31, 1979).
73 Id. at 2081.
[T]he mere fact that the union is inept, negligent, unwise, and insensitive, or
ineffectual, will not, standing alone, establish a breach of the duty.
It is clear that a union breaches its duty ... if its actions are attributable to
improper motives or fraud ...
If there is no basis upon which the union's conduct can be explained, the
conduct is arbitrary. For example, the union would [breach] if it refused to
process a grievance without any inquiry or with such a perfunctory inquiry that
it is tantamount to no inquiry at all. If there is a contract or internal union
policy that clearly and unambiguously supports the employee's position, and the
union refuses to support the employee without explanation, such conduct
would be arbitrary ....
... [T]he union's inquiry into the facts ... need not be the kind of
exhaustive inquiry that one would expect from a skilled investigator.... So
long as the union makes some inquiry into the facts, and so long as the union's
contract interpretation has some basis in reason, the union's refusal to process
the grievance will not be considered arbitrary.
Although it is well established that mere negligence will not establish a
breach of the duty . . . there could be cases where the negligence is so gross as
to constitute reckless disregard of the interests of the employee. ... [T]he Sixth
and Ninth Circuits have indicated that gross negligence may violate §
8(b)(1)(A) ...
ld.
'4 The General Counsel acts as a prosecutor before the Board, and has absolute au-
thority over whether a complaint shall issue in an unfair labor practice case. The Board
cannot overrule his refusal to prosecute. The Board acts as a court, ruling on cases pre-
sented by the General Counsel. Thus the Counsel's conception of the duty of fair represen-
tation, though based on Board decisions, does not bind the Board. See K. McGuINNESS,
supra note 37, at §§ 2-1, 2-2, 2-4.
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III
WHAT STANDARD OF CARE.
Conflicting Board and court decisions on the proper standard
for measuring the duty of fair representation raise the question of
whether the Board and the courts should adopt ordinary negli-
gence, or some other standard more protective of the union.75
Three arguments support the adoption of an ordinary negli-
gence standard. First, this standard most effectively protects the
employee. Because many contracts provide for union control of
the grievance process, 7 6 a union official's negligent failure to file a
timely grievance or to investigate or advocate an employee's griev-
ance adequately may leave the employee without a contractual
means to remedy the employer's wrong. 77 As a result, the union,
through its negligence, shields the employer rather than protects
" Commentators debate whether any negligence standard should be imposed on un-
ions. Many of the same arguments apply to the choice between ordinary negligence and
standards more protective of the union, such as gross negligence. Compare Flynn & Hig-
gins, Fair Representation: A Survey of the Contemporary Framework and a Proposed Change in the
Duty Owed to the Employee, 8 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 1096, 1151 (1974) and Tobias, Individual
Employee Suits for Breach of the Labor Agreement and the Union's Duty of Fair Representation, 5 U.
TOLEDO L. REv. 514, 559-61 (1974) with Fanning, The Duty of Fair Representation, 19 B.C. L.
REv. 813, 830-37 (1978). Clyde Summers explicitly advocates an ordinary negligence stan-
dard. See Summers, The Individual Employee's Rights Under the Collective Agreement: What Con-
stitutes Fair Representation?, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 251, 277-78 (1977).
76 See note 131 and accompanying text infra.
77 The unusually short statutes of limitations within which to file a grievance,
incorporated into most collective bargaining agreements, can leave an
employee whose union files an untimely grievance remediless ...
The importance of the doctrine of finality of labor arbitration often means
that the employee's court of last resort is the internal arbitration proceeding.
Negligent representation during arbitration can be as detrimental to an
employee as an absolute refusal to file a grievance by the union.
Flynn & Higgins, supra note 75, at 1145 (footnote omitted).
The finality doctrine, established in United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car
Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 599 (1960) (Steelworkers Trilogy), bars a court from setting aside an
arbitrator's award solely because the court disagrees with the arbitrator on the merits. Cer-
tain forms of unfairness in the arbitration process, however, can void an award. Courts can
also set aside awards if the arbitrator lacked jurisdiction or exceeded his authority. R.
GORMAN, BASic TEXT ON LABOR LAW 586-92 (1976). Under the United States Arbitration
Act, an arbitration is voidable in the event of corruption or fraud, partiality or prejudicial
misbehavior of the arbitrator, or an arbitrator's failure to make a final decision. 9 U.S.C. §
10 (1976). See generally R. GORMAN, supra, at 584-603. The decision in Hines v. Anchor
Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 570-72 (1976), allowed a court to set aside an arbitration
award when tainted by union breach of the fair representation duty.
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the employee. 78 This result flies in the face of federal labor pol-
icy. 79 Second, adoption of an ordinary negligence standard may
ameliorate inherent conflicts of interest between an in-
stitutionalized union and its membership. The interests of a well-
established union extend beyond the interests of its membership.
Large unions must strike a balance between maintaining a conge-
nial relationship with the employer and retaining support of a
majority of the employees. 80 These often conflicting interests
may cause careless grievance processing because the union leader-
ship, consciously or subconsciously, might prefer to avoid pursu-
ing so many grievances that the employer becomes upset, particu-
larly where the greivances are filed by unpopular individuals and
will have little direct impact on the majority of members. 81 Yet
the benefits to the membership of diligent processing of meritori-
Negligent grievance handling by the union not only forecloses the employee from his
contractual remedies, but also deprives him of a federal court remedy in circuits that im-
pose a higher threshold of conduct to establish union breach. An employee cannot sue his
employer under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (29 U.S.C. § 185 (1976))
unless he can first establish that the union breached its fair representation duty. See note
101 infra.
78 Thus, the union that carelessly neglects to file a grievance on time, or forgets
to file a timely demand for arbitration, . . . or fails to contact key witnesses or
inspect important documents, is immune from liability. In addition, the
employer is also immune from liability and can use the union's negligence as a
shield against its own misconduct.
Tobias, A Plea for the Wrongfully Discharged Employee Abandoned by His Union, 41 U. CIN. L.
REv. 55, 74 (1972) (footnotes omitted). See Comment, Ruzicka v. General Motors: An Unlikely
Hero of the Trade Union Movement-The Individual Employee in a Section 301 Case Who Has
Been a Victim of Union Negligence, 24 WAYNE L. REv. 1773, 1782 (1978).
79 Federal labor policy provides that employers should not benefit from union negli-
gence. See Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554 (1976); Vaca v. Sipes, 386
U.S. 171 (1967); Joliet & E. R.R. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711 (1945), aff'd on rehearing, 327 U.S.
661 (1946). An employer would benefit if a union missed a grievance-filing deadline and
the discharged employee could not sue. To allow a union to protect the employer is incon-
sistent with the federal policy of strengthening unions and maintaining equality of bargain-
ing power. Comment, supra note 88, at 1783.
80 Note, The Duty of Fair Representation and Exclusive Representation in Grievance Adminis-
tration: The Duty of Fair Representation, 27 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1199, 1208-11 (1976). In-
stitutionalized unions also must satisfy requirements imposed by the national union office.
Id.
.i See id. at 1211-14. The union can legitimately screen out nonmeritorious grievances,
because an individual employee does not have an absolute right to full processing of his
grievance through arbitration. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 191 (1967). The union's deci-
sion that a grievance lacks merit because the employer's conduct does not violate the con-
tract differs from a decision that a grievance lacks merit because it does not advance the
interests of a majority of the union membership. The latter rationale can disguise the
union's own political interests. Note, supra note 80, at 1213-14.
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ous grievances are substantial.8 2 Established precedents, 3 as well
as the threat of vigorous union action, may deter the employer
from further contract breaches. To the extent it prevents such
carelessness, a negligence standard would buttress the employee's
interest in effective grievance processing against contrary union
tendencies. Third, some courts, including, arguably, the Supreme
Court, regard the union's duty as fiduciary in nature.84  Unions
actively seek and voluntarily assume their positions as exclusive
bargaining agents. In many cases the union negotiates a contract
giving the union complete control over the grievance process and
suspending the employee's statutory right to present grievances
independently.8 5  Because of this fiduciary relationship,86 the
82 "Thus, where a representative serves its own political or other interests, causing the
loss of a meritorious grievance, the union many actually have acted against the bargaining
unit's interest in contract enforcement." Note, supra note 80, at 1216.
83 Id.
84 Although the Supreme Court has not explicitly held that the union owes a fiduciary
duty to employees in the bargaining unit, the Court has described the fair representation
duty in similar terms. The Court grounded the duty in the "principle ... that the exercise
of a granted power to act in behalf of others involves the assumption toward them of a duty to
exercise the power in their interest and behalf .... " Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R.,
323 U.S. 192, 202 (1944) (emphasis added). In another case, the Court said exclusive bar-
gaining agents "must execute their trust without lawless invasions of the rights of other work-
ers." Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Howard, 343 U.S. 768, 774 (1952) (emphasis
added).
Lower courts have interpreted these statements as imposing a fiduciary duty on un-
ions. The Fourth Circuit recognized that "Although the Supreme Court has not explicitly
characterized this obligation [of fair representation] by the very term 'fiduciary relation-
ship,' its treatment of the subject is tantamount thereto. ... [Ilt is plain that in the Su-
preme Court's view the federal statutory duty of fair representation is not unlike a com-
mon law fiduciary obligation." Thompson v. Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters, 316
F.2d 191, 201 (4th Cir. 1963). See Smith v. Hussmann Refrig. Co., No. 78-1034, slip op. at
16 (8th Cir., filed Jan. 21, 1980) (en banc) (Employee plaintiffs "possessed rights under the
collective bargaining agreement which the union had a fiduciary duty to protect."); Bazarte
v. United Transp. Union, 429 F.2d 868, 871 (3d Cir. 1970) ("The fiduciary duty of fair
representation"); IBEW Local 801 v. NLRB, 307 F.2d 679, 683 (D.C. Cir. 1962) ("The
requirement of fair dealing between a union and its members is in a sense fiduciary in
nature .... ").
85 The fact that unions have, by contract, asserted exclusive control over en-
forcement of the collective agreement imposes on them a heavier responsibility
to exercise that control on behalf of, rather than against, the individual
employee. The collective agreement creates rights in the individual employee
that are enforceable under Section 301. [29 U.S.C. § 185 (1976)]. In the ab-
sence of a union-controlled grievance procedure, the individual can sue and
enforce his rights on his behalf. ... The union, having deprived the individual
of his ability to enforce his own rights, has a special obligation to act on his
behalf.
Summers, The Individual Employee's Rights Under the Collective Agreement: What Constitutes Fair
Representation, in McKELVEY, supra note 18, at 63-64 (footnote omitted). See Comment, supra
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union should be held to the same due care standard courts have
imposed on other fiduciaries.87
Opponents of an ordinary negligence standard maintain that
it would require a higher level of expertise and literacy than the
average shop steward possesses. 88 The cost of properly training
shop stewards (or hiring lawyers to assume the stewards' grievance
duties) might prove prohibitively expensive for small unions and
divert resources from other union activities.8 9 These fears are
unwarranted. Unions can minimize training costs by using simple
written materials and videotapes. Representatives from union
headquarters could supervise grievance handling and present
cases at arbitration, avoiding the need for each local to retain a
lawyer.
note 78, at 1783. Section 9 of the National Labor Relations Act (29 U.S.C. § 159 (1976))
gives employees the right to present grievances to their employer directly or through their
union, but employees may vote to approve a contract that surrenders their § 9 right to
present grievances directly.
86 See Flynn & Higgins, supra note 75, at 1148-49; Jones, The Origins of the Concept of the
Duty of Fair Representation, in McKELVEY, supra note 18, at 27-28; Rolnick, The Duty of Fair
Representation in Processing Grievances to Arbitration Under the Connecticut Teacher Negotiation
Act, 49 CONN. B.J. 92, 102 (1975); Summers, supra note 75, at 276-77; Tobias, supra note
75, at 524-25.
87 The Supreme Court has already imposed on union officials the fiduciary duty to act
with good faith when exercising discretion or judgment. In a contract negotiation case
where the union accepted a clause'that benefited some members but caused the layoff of
others, the Supreme Court allowed the union "[a] wide range of reasonableness ... in
serving the unit it represents, subject always to complete good faith and honesty of purpose in
the exercise of its discretion." Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 338 (1953) (em-
phasis added). The Court later imposed the same standard on discretionary decisions in
grievance processing. Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 349-50 (1964).
88 See Vladeck, The Conflict Between the Duty of Fair Representation and the Limitations on
Union Self-Government, in McKELVEY, supra note 18, at 44-45.
We should not forget that unions are governed and administered by non-
lawyers, working people who come from the shops....
At the initial but very important stages of the processing of grievances, who
is involved on the union side? A worker in the shop .... [Tihe level of literacy
of the shop steward is often not adequate for making a sharply defined claim.
The written grievance statement is frequently incomprehensible and has no
clear reference to any specific contractual violation. In this connection, it must
be remembered that the shop steward has been chosen by coworkers not be-
cause he can read the contract, not because he can effectively present griev-
ances to an employer at the first step, but because they like him.
Id. at 44-45.
89 Note, Schum v. South Buffalo Ry.: Unintentional Union Failure to Process Grievance
Constitutes Breach of Union's Duty of Fair Representation, 1974 DUKE L.J. 988, 998 (1974). See
also Adomeit, Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight: Another Step in the Seemingly Inexorable March
Toward Converting Federal Judges (and Juries) into Labor Arbitrators of Last Resort, 9 CONN. L.
REV. 627, 634-35 (1977) (malpractice liability may bankrupt small unions).
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Critics also argue that an ordinary negligence standard might
reduce the effectiveness of shop stewards. Union members often
select a steward because he is popular or approachable, not be-
cause he is the candidate best suited to investigate and process
complaints.9" Critics argue that if the workers were required to
select a person better able to process grievances, he might be less
approachable. Consequently, fewer meritorious grievances might
be filed. The success rate of the grievances filed by a trained
steward, however, would probably increase, because he could
investigate thoroughly, frame the grievance precisely, and advo-
cate effectively. The net result would be an increase, rather than a
decrease, in steward effectiveness.
Critics also argue that an ordinary negligence standard would
greatly reduce the union's discretion to sift meritorious from
frivolous grievances and to settle meritorious grievances without
arbitration.91 The adoption of this standard, however, will have
no effect on the union's discretionary power. In applying the neg-
ligence standard, courts require careful investigation and process-
ing of grievances,92 but do not evaluate the merits of the union's
decisions. In fact, the due care standard would protect the union's
discretionary power since full investigation would produce the
reasoned judgment necessary to sustain a discretionary decision
when challenged. 93
90 See note 88 supra.
91 See note 87 supra.
92 Courts that impose the due care standard have confined their scrutiny to the union's
procedures in accepting and processing grievances. See Smith v. Hussmann Refrig. Co. No.
78-1034 (8th Cir., filed Jan. 21, 1980) (en banc) (when contract provides that seniority gov-
erns promotions only when qualifications of two candidates are equal, union has duty to
investigate qualifications of promotee and challenger before deciding to file seniority griev-
ance for challenger); Milstead v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 597, 580 F.2d 232,
235 (6th Cir. 1978) (duty of fair representation breached when "union ineptly handles a
grievance because it is ignorant of those contract provisions having a direct bearing on the
case.").
91 Courts have required that a union must act honestly and in good faith when process-
ing and settling grievances (Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 349 (1964)), but court
decisions have not affected the union's power to settle a grievance before arbitration. Vaca
v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190-91 (1967). See note 87 supra. Vaca added the requirement that
the discretionary decision not be arbitrary. "Though we accept the proposition that a union
may not arbitrarily ignore a meritorious grievance or process it in a perfunctory fashion,
we do not agree that the individual employee has an absolute right to have his grievance
taken to arbitration ... " Id. at 191. The addition of the arbitrary standard means that the
union's decision must be rational. Tedford v. Peabody Coal Co., 533 F.2d 952, 957 (5th
Cir. 1976); note 19 and accompanying text supra. Thus, if a union collects substantial evi-
dence on both sides of a grievance, and bases its decision on the evidence, its decision will
withstand the arbitrary test.
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Opponents of an ordinary negligence standard also fear that
the adoption of this standard would flood the grievance process
with complaints. They argue that unions, fearful of employee
suits, might pursue frivolous complaints.9 4 Although additional
grievances might be arbitrated, the fear that grievance processes
would be paralyzed is exaggerated. 95  Commentators voiced a
similar fear when courts expanded the scope of the union's duty
in the past,96 but their fears proved unwarranted. By requiring an
employee to prove that the union's negligence substantially prej-
udiced him,97 courts have reduced the unions' fear of suit. Un-
ions can take other steps to protect themselves from suit, such as
increasing supervision of the grievance process by central union
officers and establishing standardized procedures for determining
how far to pursue a grievance. 98 If the union accepts a grievance
but later decides not to pursue or fully advocate it, the union
14 Rabin, supra note 30, at 858. Some observers fear that the grievance process would
break down under the load. See, e.g., Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 192 (1967).
" See Rabin, supra note 30, at 858. Rabin discusses a University of Michigan survey that
showed that 15% of all arbitration cases result from fear of a fair representation suit. Id. at
858 n.44, citing ABA SECTION OF LABOR RELATIONS LAW REPORT OF 1974 PROCEEDINGS
102, 105-06 (1974). See also Summers, The Individual Employee's Rights under the Collective
Agreement: What Constitutes Fair Representation, PROCEEDINGS OF 2 7TH ANNUAL MEETING OF
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 14, 32, 36-37, 42, 55 (1975).
Fear of court suit should only motivate unions to process meritorious grievances be-
cause
a member will only be able to successfully sue in court if he has a meritorious
grievance that was not fully processed to arbitration by the union. The most
that this will do is to force a union in borderline cases to give the benefit of the
doubt to the discharged grievant and process the grievance through arbitration.
Note, Fair Representation-Discharge Cases Demand a High Degree of Care, 51 J. URB. L. 575,
582 (1974).
96 E.g. Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, 424 U.S. 554 (1976). Hines held that an arbitra-
tion award could be set aside if the union's breach of duty tainted the arbitration process.
See note 77 supra.
'7 Since Hines, courts have required the disappointed grievant to prove not only that
the union breached its duty but that the breach "seriously undermined the integrity of the
grievance procedure." Comment, The Union's Duty of Fair Representation: Group Membership
Interests v. Individual Interests, 16 DuQ. L. REV. 779, 789-90. See Cofrancesco v. City of Wil-
mington, 419 F. Supp. 109, 111 (D. Del. 1976); Siskey v. General Teamsters Local 261, 419
F. Supp. 48, 53 (W.D. Pa. 1976).
98 A group decision process would protect the union from charges of negligence and
arbitrariness by fostering careful investigation of grievances. Under such a system, the
committee would compare the facts of each case to established standards before deciding
whether to accept and process the grievance. This comparison would tend to produce
reasoned decisions, which could rebut subsequent claims of arbitrariness. Group decision-
making would likewise insulate the decision from allegations of individual caprice. See Rol-
nick, supra note 86, at 203-04.
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could notify the employee so that he could hire his own attorney
to represent him in the grievance process. 99
Employers may oppose adoption of an ordinary negligence
standard for unions because potential employer liability for con-
tract breach would increase. Because an aggrieved employee can-
not recover damages from an employer in a section 301 suit 100
for breach of contract unless he proves that the union breached
its duty of fair representation, 0 1 the adoption of an ordinary neg-
ligence standard increases the employee's chances of reaching his
employer. Once the employee proves a breach, the employer
bears the primary burden of compensating him. The fear of in-
creased employer exposure to liability is not a legitimate basis on
which to oppose a higher standard of care for unions. Congress
did not intend the union's breach to serve as a barrier to
employer liability.10 2
Finally, employers and other opponents of an ordinary negli-
gence standard argue that this standard would increase employer liti-
gation costs by encouraging employees to institute judicial pro-
ceedings. An employee who has been wronged by his employer
and whose union has breached its duty of fair representation has
three avenues of redress. First, he may sue the employer for
'9 See Tobias, supra note 75, at 560 (suggesting that courts should grant de novo hearing
when union fails to allow employee reasonable opportunity to retain his own lawyer). A
union might accept a grievance because contract terms are violated, but might not pursue
it because of the insignificance of the contract term or the minimal impact of the breach.
For example, a contract may provide that the employer will not pay for overtime worked
without prior union approval. If the employer, however, routinely pays for non-approved
overtime, his failure to do so in one or two instances might not seem a serious breach to
the union.
1oo 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1976).
,01 Under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (29 U.S.C. § 185 (1976)), an
employee generally may sue his employer for breach of the collective bargaining agree-
ment. Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962). If the collective bargaining
agreement provides that the union has the sole right to raise grievances with the employer,
however, the employee must attempt to exhaust these contractual remedies before filing
suit. Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650 (1965). The employee may escape the
exhaustion requirement if he can show the futility of relying on the union because of its
breach of the duty of fair representation. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 185 (1967). Thus,
employees who sue employers often must also file a suit against the union.
102 We cannot believe that Congress, in conferring upon employers and unions the
power to establish exclusive procedures, intended to confer upon unions ...
unlimited discretion to deprive injured employees of all remedies for breach of
contract. Nor do we think that Congress intended to shield employers from the
natural consequences of their breaches of bargaining agreements by wrongful
union conduct in the enforcement of such agreements.
Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 186 (1967).
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breach of the contract under § 301 of the Labor Management
Relations Act. 10 3 Second, he may sue the union for breach of the
duty of fair representation and may join the employer.1 0 4  Fi-
nally, he may petition the NLRB to prosecute the union for hav-
ing committed an unfair labor practice.' 0 5  By refusing to recog-
nize negligent grievance processing as a breach of the union's
duty of fair representation, the NLRB has driven many employees
into the courts to vindicate their rights.'0 6 If the Board opened
its doors to these employees by adopting an ordinary negligence
standard, the employee could, petition the Board to bring an unfair
labor practice charge against the union. Because the employer would
not be a party in this proceeding he would bear no litigation ex-
penses. If the Board found that the union breached its duty, the
NLRB could order the union to process the grievance or provide
an outside attorney to do so. t0 7  The NLRB order could specify
that if the grievance process vindicated the employee, the union
would be liable for backpay lost as a direct result of the union's
breach.i"" The employee would not sue the employer unless he
103 See note 101 supra.
104 In Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 197 (1967), the Supreme Court noted that the
employer might be joined as a defendant in the action so that the employer could not
"hide behind the union's wrongful failure to act." Each defendant would be liable for
damage that it proximately caused. Thus, union liability would generally be slight, unless it
actually caused the discharge or another contract violation. Subsequently, the Supreme
Court held a union liable for damages to the extent that its breach added to the difficulty
and expense of recovering from the employer. Czosek v. O'Mara, 397 U.S. 25, 29 (1970);
see Tobias, supra note 75, at 550. Such damages would usually be limited to attorney's fees
and costs of a § 301 suit.
10s See notes 39-42 and accompanying text supra.
106 The NLRB's position has not forced employees to seek judicial relief in the circuits
that have not yet accepted the ordinary negligence standard. See note 22 supra. In these
jurisdictions, an employee who can only allege ordinary negligence in the handling of his
grievance is foreclosed from any remedy.
107 Hiring an outside attorney would avoid the risk that union hostility or disinterest
would taint the Board-ordered grievance processing. Although union negligence may cause
the initial breach, forcing the union to represent the employee before the NLRB may
engender true hostility. See Tobias, supra note 75, at 553. The Board has discretionary
power to order affirmative action to correct the unfair labor practice as long as that correc-
tive action is not punitive. Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941); Consoli-
dated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197 (1938); K. McGuINESS, How To TAKE A CASE
BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 296 (4th ed. 1976). The board has re-
cently assessed reimbursement of litigation expenses in unfair labor practice cases. Id. at
311.
I0 Additionally, a federal suit may provide for a greater monetary recovery. The
employer cannot be joined as a party in an NLRB unfair labor practice complaint unless
the employee alleges that he conspired in the union breach. Thus, an employee filing a
claim with the NLRB can recover only from the union. See Note, supra note 43, at 447. In
addition, the NLRB can award only backpay. A federal court, however, can compensate
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wanted full compensatory damages." 9 The Board would thus
promote the use of grievance procedures to resolve alleged con-
tract breaches and reduce employee recourse to the courts. In ad-
dition, Board-ordered grievance presentations by outside attor-
neys would enhance the binding effect of the resulting arbitration
by insuring full advocacy. 110 Grievants disappointed by arbitra-
tion results would be discouraged from suing the employer, be-
cause they would have little chance of overturning the award.
CONCLUSION
Federal courts originally limited the union's duty of fair rep-
resentation to the obligation to refrain from racial and political
discrimination. In subsequent decisions, a number of circuit courts
expanded the duty to include an affirmative obligation to use due
care in accepting and processing grievances."' The National
Labor Relations Board has lagged behind these courts in extend-
ing fair representation to include an affirmative duty." 2  Such a
duty would most effectively protect the employee and would re-
duce the harmful effects of union institutionalization on grievance
processing. The negligence standard is appropriate because the
union stands in a fiduciary relationship to the members of its bar-
gaining unit. Board action based on an ordinary negligence stan-
him for all damages suffered as a result of the employer's action. See Flynn & Higgins,
supra note 75.
109 In some instances an employee might prefer restoration of his contractual rights to
compensatory damages, less the attorney's contingent fee, particularly where the employee
is still working but had been denied seniority by the employer. In such cases, the differ-
ence between the backpay the Board could award and the compensatory damages a federal
court could order would be slight. Even in discharge cases, where compensatory damages
are likely to be higher than backpay, some workers might rather win access to the griev-
ance process at their former workplace than hunt for another job and face the delays and
uncertainties of federal court litigation.
The Board remedy has another advantage for the employee: He need not pay any
litigation costs, because the NLRB General Counsel would prosecute his case. See note 74
supra.
11 The finality doctrine does not protect an arbitration award in favor of the employer
if the union breached its duty of fair representation in the arbitration. Hines v. Anchor
Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554 (1976). See notes 77 & 107 supra.
"' See note 21 and accompanying text supra.
112 The General Counsel has indicated that he will only prosecute breaches of the duty
of fair representation when the union's conduct is grossly negligent. See note 73 supra. The
General Counsel's decision on this matter is not reviewable by either the Board or the
courts. K. McGuINESS, How TO TAKE A CASE BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
BOARD 27 (4th ed. 1976). If the General Counsel continues to follow this policy, the Board
will have few opportunities to consider cases where only ordinary negligence is alleged.
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dard would encourage the union to protect the employee, who
otherwise is limited in enforcing his contractual rights. Further,
adoption of a due care standard by the NLRB would significantly
reduce employer litigation costs by providing an alternate forum
through which the employee can require the union to fulfill its
obligation to carefully and fairly represent him in the contractual
grievance procedure.
Neva S. Flaherty
